{"id":188,"date":"2013-03-15T14:45:23","date_gmt":"2013-03-15T14:45:23","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/?p=188"},"modified":"2025-11-11T15:49:28","modified_gmt":"2025-11-11T14:49:28","slug":"blog-post-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/blog-post-3\/","title":{"rendered":"The irresistible charm of a fixed exchange rate"},"content":{"rendered":"

The exchange rate is to the economy what temperature is to our body: it reflects its overall health. For the rate to be competitive and stable, it is not worth treating the rate itself, the economic system must be treated \u2013 the economy is what must become competitive. 18 months is not enough for Serbia to achieve this, as Mr. \u0110ilas states in a recent interview in\u00a0Politika<\/a>. To \u201elower the temperature,\u201c one must work on the very foundations of the economic system, and this would \u201etreat\u201c many other things: petty and grand corruption, the grumpiness of clerks, negligence, and above all, it would eliminate the possibility of unpunished non-compliance with contractual obligations \u2013 especially when the state is involved.<\/p>\n

\"\" <\/p>\n

As I emphasized in my conversation with the NIN journalist, to whom Mr. \u0110ilas (imprecisely) refers: the package of fiscal cuts is by no means a sufficient condition for the sustainability of a fixed exchange rate. The cuts will increase the competitiveness of the economy for a while, but the changes must be much deeper if we want an economy capable of remaining competitive thereafter, without changes in the exchange rate.<\/p>\n

How does one become a \u201ecompetitive economy\u201c? Let's start with how one does not become one: the competitiveness of the economy cannot be increased by subsidizing exporters. Someone pays for subsidies, and their costs, like all other costs of a society, are built into the competitiveness of its economy. The competitiveness of the economy can only be increased in one of two ways: either by increasing its productivity \u2013 meaning that with existing spending we produce more products that we can then sell cheaper, or by at least someone in society, and preferably everyone \u2013 state administration, producers, capital owners, farmers, pensioners \u2013 spending less. Mr. \u0110ilas is right to start his program with fiscal measures that reduce state spending. Economists also most often focus on controlling spending: our state is too large (and it is), and wages, however meager, are still too high for us to compete on the global market (and they are). However, it is forgotten that Serbia has already cut costs several times. What Serbia is incapable of is ensuring that costs do not rise again. For example, Serbia has reduced wage taxes several times, but then the increase in wages, which was not based on real economic parameters, would have eaten up a larger part of the competitiveness gained in this way.<\/p>\n

No society can muster the strength to sacrifice itself \u2013 to reduce wages it considers fair and reduce its own expectations from the state \u2013 if it cannot count on sustained and convincing productivity growth to reward that sacrifice. Let's imagine competitiveness as scissors, one blade of which is costs, and the other is the productivity of the economy. Then, Serbia must focus on the other blade \u2013 on reforms that will enable it to achieve sustained productivity growth. This is not easy either, but it will be richly rewarded because Serbia's economic potential is realistically much greater than what it is currently achieving.<\/p>\n

In normal conditions in modern economies, productivity is constantly growing because market discipline forces every market participant to constantly strive and devise ways to achieve more with what they have. The role of the state is also important. Everything it does affects the economy, if only because it burdens it with taxes, with which it covers its costs. This effect can also be very direct, as is the case with state-owned enterprises \u2013 they are part of the economy. It is obvious that when the state manages them well, it directly contributes to the growth of the economy's productivity; otherwise, it directly and indirectly reduces it. However, the state has its own \u201eproductivity\u201c even when it does not directly participate in economic activity. For example, Serbia can burden the economy with thousands of customs officers and freight forwarders whose job is to burden and slow down the movement of goods, or it can simplify regulations, reduce the number of customs officers and freight forwarders, and employ efficient (well-trained) foreign trade representatives in its missions, who will help Serbian businesses to market their products. It is obvious that in the latter case, the state had a much more \u201eproductive\u201c effect for the same money. Another example would be the choice between using the money allocated for education to \u201eproduce\u201c a smaller number of necessary and quality personnel, or a large number of completely useless ones.<\/p>\n

However, the key is in market competition, i.e., discipline. Thanks to it, humanity is fed, clothed, and transported today with a fraction of the resources that would have been needed for this a hundred years ago. There is no state wisdom and organization that can replace its citizens when everyone takes the initiative and focuses their energy on doing what is within their power to reap the rewards promised by a credible market. Therefore, it is extremely important that the same rules apply in market competition for everyone, equally and predictably \u2013 and that these rules reward saving, creativity, productivity, and risk-taking to increase them. This is not about \u201ecruel strictness,\u201c but about strict adherence to the rules. The example of Sweden best shows that a society can embrace and remove from the game those it considers weak and insufficiently competitive for that game. Sweden radically changes the market distribution of income in favor of those for whom the market is less favorable. However, Sweden does not even consider interfering with the game itself, inconsistently applying the rules of the game, and thereby diverting the economy's energy from competition to begging for help from the state.<\/p>\n

The Serbian state is not like Sweden. In Serbia, the state negatively affects productivity and market discipline in all its roles. As an example of the state as a market participant, PKB is an exception. As a rule, companies in restructuring not only do not contribute positively but also consume the economy's energy (and resources), like black holes. Instead of the state being the most reliable payer in the country, it is the source of non-payment chains that lead even the most disciplined to be unable to fulfill their obligations. Public enterprises are the largest participants in the Serbian market, and as such, their public procurement, along with state procurement, completely dictates the content and rhythm of economic activity in the country. This would not be a problem if public procurement rewarded quality and productivity. Since this is not the case, the state, in this role as well, acts as a black hole that negates and sucks in the creative energy of the market, replacing it with some other rules of behavior. As a regulator, the state often hinders rather than helps economic activity. More importantly, it often uses its power to avoid, with impunity, respecting the rules of the game that should protect. It is not unusual, nor is it punished, for a new local government to simply renounce contracts that the previous government, formally legally, signed with \u201eits\u201c private partners. Finally, we come to wastefulness \u2013 the Serbian state burdens the economy and society, and in return offers them unusable personnel, healthcare for which one must \u201epay\u201c twice, and so on.<\/p>\n

I would say that Mr. \u0110ilas, in his experience with PKB, discovered both the extent of our wasted economic potential and that to activate it, the state needs to be \u201efixed.\u201c However, he is mistaken if he thinks he can \u201efix\u201c it by multiplying his experience. Even if we disregard the fact that a state where good decisions depend on who governs it would only be good as long as they are in power, management by personal intervention must fail the test sooner or later, because political leaders find themselves in the \u201eschizophrenic role\u201c of representing the public interest and the interest of their party. Which of our politicians can say that they would be able to reduce salaries and pensions by 15 percent to defend a fixed exchange rate, after some external shock three months before an election, precisely because it is in Serbia's interest?<\/p>\n

\u201eA \u201cgood\" state is not one whose leaders make good decisions, but one that limits the decision-making scope of its leaders by protecting the public interest through laws, processes, and procedures, and by forcing them to respect the rules of the game that apply to everyone. Such a state can only be built by political leaders with the help, or rather, under the watchful eye, engagement, and pressure of the public, i.e., the elite. (It is not enough to copy European laws.) Therefore, politicians cannot do it on their own, certainly. However, the role of a statesman is to recognize what kind of state we need, and the first step is to clearly commit themselves and their party to working on its construction.<\/p>\n

Therefore, a program \u2013 DS's or any other party's, which would enable the establishment of a sustainable fixed exchange rate \u2013 i.e., Serbia's lasting ability to improve its productivity \u2013 would have to start by establishing principles, criteria, and procedures that would tie the hands of politicians and parties in advance in making many decisions. In our case \u2013 in deciding on a specific fiscal program, by what criteria would Mr. \u0110ilas choose how to achieve savings in the announced package of fiscal measures? To whom would he be a mother, and to whom a stepmother? The criteria must be explicit and verifiable. Then, how do we develop support programs for the economy? Explicit development visions should be formulated (and put to the test of voters), and then explicit criteria, procedures for developing specific programs, and measures for verifying results during implementation, as I explained in more detail in\u00a0my text<\/a>\u00a0(the first part of the text, you can read\u00a0here<\/a>). And finally, most importantly, and relatively easy to implement, the space for arbitrary state action in the market must be closed.<\/p>\n

Special support for exports and agriculture is announced. Perhaps the reasons for choosing these two areas are obvious, but the question arises according to what criteria will it be decided who and how exactly should be helped? How will the public verify that it is not a criterion of party affiliation? Tightening market discipline, even if only initially, is of particular importance and can also produce quick effects. It requires more serious implementation of a series of measures that accelerate execution, collection, bankruptcy, but the package of measures must start with disciplining the state's own payments. In that case, the will of individual political leaders is not enough; they must limit each other through state program documents that compel them to work consistently on the realization of proclaimed goals. As we have the opportunity to see these days, while the Ministry of Economy and Finance is trying to reduce arrears in state payments, it is simultaneously ignoring EPS's financial needs. These, in turn, largely stem from the fact that the energy price has not covered costs for several years, which means that EPS is transferring part of its obligations to the rest of the economy. A serious program of measures could announce how the state will commit to changing this behavior \u2013 for example, by proposing a super-law according to which any delay by the state can be expensively and easily collected by the unwilling creditor. If someone on the Serbian political scene offered such a program, Serbian society, and civil society in particular, would have the opportunity and obligation to seriously undertake the task of monitoring and holding such a political option accountable, and exposing the arbitrariness of any different program to ridicule.<\/p>\n

As long as such an option does not realistically appear on the Serbian public scene, a different debate should be opened: is inflation targeting the best method for determining the exchange rate for Serbia, or should we review the conclusions of the latest research which shows that for economic growth in the world, methods that stabilize the exchange rate to a much greater extent than is the case here are still the best? In this way, both businessmen and the population would gain greater stability and predictability of the exchange rate, and speculators would earn a little less.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Valutni kurs je za privredu ono \u0161to je temperatura za na\u0161e telo: odra\u017eava njeno sveukupno zdravlje. Da bi kurs bio konkurentan i stabilan, ne vredi le\u010diti sam kurs, mora se le\u010diti privredni sistem \u2013 privreda je ta koja mora da postane konkurentna. Srbiji nije dovoljno 18 meseci da to postigne, kao \u0161to g. \u0110ilas navodi […]<\/p>\n

Programska oblast: <\/span>Vesti<\/a>, Ekonomsko upravljanje i poslovno okru\u017eenje<\/a>, Razvoj privatnog sektora i industrijska politika<\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":1281,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,59,68],"tags":[67,71,70],"class_list":["post-188","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-vesti","category-ekonomsko-upravljanje-i-poslovno-okruzenje","category-razvoj-privatnog-sektora-i-industrijska-politika","tag-drzavna-administracija","tag-izvoz","tag-sme"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nNeodoljivi \u0161arm fiksnog kursa - Ceves | Centar za visoke ekonomske studije<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/blog-post-3\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Neodoljivi \u0161arm fiksnog kursa - Ceves | Centar za visoke ekonomske studije\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Valutni kurs je za privredu ono \u0161to je temperatura za na\u0161e telo: odra\u017eava njeno sveukupno zdravlje. Da bi kurs bio konkurentan i stabilan, ne vredi le\u010diti sam kurs, mora se le\u010diti privredni sistem \u2013 privreda je ta koja mora da postane konkurentna. Srbiji nije dovoljno 18 meseci da to postigne, kao \u0161to g. \u0110ilas navodi […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/blog-post-3\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ceves | Centar za visoke ekonomske studije\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/CEVES.org\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2013-03-15T14:45:23+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-11-11T14:49:28+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/03\/fx-rate-3001.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"300\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"220\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Stefan Radisavljevic\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@CEVES1\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@CEVES1\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Stefan Radisavljevic\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"10 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Stefan Radisavljevic\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/2c1e819f2d06fc068dd55466231f1e16\"},\"headline\":\"Neodoljivi \u0161arm fiksnog kursa\",\"datePublished\":\"2013-03-15T14:45:23+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-11-11T14:49:28+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":2025,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2013\\\/03\\\/fx-rate-3001.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"Dr\u017eavna administracija\",\"Izvoz\",\"SME\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Vesti\",\"Ekonomsko upravljanje i poslovno okru\u017eenje\",\"Razvoj privatnog sektora i industrijska politika\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/blog-post-3\\\/\",\"name\":\"Neodoljivi \u0161arm fiksnog kursa - 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Da bi kurs bio konkurentan i stabilan, ne vredi le\u010diti sam kurs, mora se le\u010diti privredni sistem \u2013 privreda je ta koja mora da postane konkurentna. 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