{"id":6888,"date":"2020-03-29T10:59:18","date_gmt":"2020-03-29T08:59:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/?p=6888"},"modified":"2025-11-11T15:48:05","modified_gmt":"2025-11-11T14:48:05","slug":"sr-imperativ-za-mere-podrske-obilata-likvidnost-uz-disciplinu-placanja","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/sr-imperativ-za-mere-podrske-obilata-likvidnost-uz-disciplinu-placanja\/","title":{"rendered":"Imperative for support measures \u2013 abundant liquidity with payment discipline"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Author: Kori Udovi\u010dki, PhD<\/em><em>, first published 3\/29\/2020, revised 4\/1\/2020.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/fajlovi\/Op_Ed_likvidnost_disciplina_ver2_srp_06APR20.pdf\">Download the text in PDF<\/a><strong><br \/>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><em>The pandemic caught us just as payment discipline in Serbia was beginning to strengthen significantly. After financial discipline measures for the private sector were intensified in 2016, and non-payments by the state were reduced as part of fiscal consolidation, the chain of illiquidity was finally significantly reduced. Of course, no one expected the pandemic<\/em><em> and it will cost us, without exception. In case<\/em><em> payment discipline falters now, it will cost us much more. Those who cannot achieve liquidity at all will simply not be able to pay. The state's task is to ensure that there are as few such cases as possible, and it must start with itself. <\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>If it wants to mitigate the decline in economic activity during the pandemic and ensure its rapid recovery once the pandemic ends, the key task of the state is to accompany intervention measures with measures to preserve payment discipline.<\/strong> I start from the assumption that it is clear to the reader how important this discipline is for economic growth. In short: non-payment creates a chain of illiquidity, which then backfires on everyone. The first debtor drags down their partners, suppliers, and employees, who in turn drag down those, now many, in the third tier. In this way, illiquidity spreads rapidly through the system with a \u201esnowball effect\u201c and further affects everyone \u2013 even those whose business would not be disrupted by the pandemic. The worst part is that mistrust also spreads, discouraging new business ventures, and which carries over into the period after the crisis. Simply put, all economic activity is stifled in the long run.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Discipline<\/strong><strong> of payment<\/strong><strong> is<\/strong><strong> actually one of the pillars of financial discipline.<\/strong> We understand financial discipline as the motto \u201eyou get what you pay for\u201c. We mostly interpret this as needing to plan the budget carefully \u2013 which constitutes the first pillar. However, the discipline of realistic planning makes no sense unless it is accompanied by payment discipline. When the music is over, then it <em>must<\/em> be paid for. Even when we have to (unplanned) borrow to pay. Not even the best plans can foresee everything. But for prompt payment to always be possible, liquidity is needed. We can consider the availability of liquidity as the third pillar of financial discipline. These three pillars are mutually dependent. Only if we know that we <em>will<\/em> certainly <em>have to pay, will we<\/em> truly.<\/p>\n<p><strong>take care to plan realistically. Only if we plan realistically will we be creditworthy when unexpected turns do occur. And, finally, only if we have access to liquidity will we be able to realize that creditworthiness, i.e., borrow and pay.<\/strong>. Financial discipline is a matter of political will and the development of a financial management system. In the more distant past, we planned unrealistically and lent carelessly. In the end, we paid with inflation. The 1990s saw both hyperinflation and non-payment. Since the 2000s, we have begun to plan more realistically, but not enough. Therefore, we continued to enforce our \u201ebelt-tightening\u201c through non-payment, i.e., delays. Costs not paid this year burden the budget for the next. Instead of the financial market, the economy and citizens finance the difference. The key at this moment is to understand the harm of non-payment and tackle this problem. The Government also needs to be brave enough to seek liquidity for the payment of all differences between expenses and revenues, even unexpected ones, on the market. Maintaining financial discipline despite more flexible borrowing on the market also requires Serbia to use financial management instruments more decisively and honestly: primarily budget planning and revision, which have been developed over the past two decades.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Control of spending through <\/strong><strong>payment restrictions<\/strong><strong> at a time when the state needs to stimulate economic activity by increasing the deficit is like pressing the accelerator while simultaneously pulling the handbrake. <\/strong>This very unusual combination of actions explains why the large fiscal deficit in the period from 2010 to 2013 did not contribute more to economic growth. By the same logic, the combination in the opposite direction explains why the recent sharp fiscal consolidation in the period from 2015 to 2017 was not accompanied by a sharper contraction of economic activity: the fiscal belt-tightening was accompanied by a reduction in arrears in the public sector, which led to a significant easing of liquidity. There is no justification for such a thing to happen again this time. We need a genuine fiscal stimulus: a fiscal deficit, i.e., overall public spending, paid for with hard cash liquidity.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The cost of the fiscal package, as well as its distribution, will be less important than the fact that it is accompanied by a clear intention and measures to establish firm financial discipline.<\/strong> This should by no means be taken as a call to abandon reasonable budget planning. The state must measure out a significant, but also achievable, support package for the economy and citizens. In these very uncertain times, and if it must err, it is better to err on the side of generosity than stinginess. We are witnessing that this crisis is the \u201emother\u201c of unimaginable, unexpected turns. Responsible planning, as the first pillar of discipline, will be considered and revised as needed if possible. The state, economic entities, and citizens can certainly expect that they will produce less this year, and therefore have less to spend.<\/p>\n<p><strong>If<\/strong><strong> payment is made with liquidity, recklessness is punished by inflation<\/strong><strong>, which then must be quickly corrected. However, in its early stages, an increase in inflation would largely enable the rescue of production. <\/strong>A certain increase in inflation should be expected and allowed (this is a supply contraction crisis). Corrective intervention will be needed if it exceeds 5-7% \u2013 through spending control, not by falling into arrears. Loosening general financial discipline, along with excessive spending, would mean repeating the biggest mistake of the past. If it were accompanied by excessive liquidity, it would lead to high inflation and all that follows. If, as is more likely, it were accompanied by insufficient liquidity and non-payment of obligations, for the fourth time in three decades, we would fall into the \u201emud\u201c of unfulfillable obligations, general illiquidity and insolvency, and general mistrust. This would, clearly, again suppress economic activity in the long run.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em><u>Focus on payment discipline<\/u><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>To support payment discipline throughout the system, the state must demonstrate commitment, set an example, and pay all its still significant outstanding obligations. <\/strong><strong>There are still many of them. <\/strong>The state itself was recently a key link in payment indiscipline in Serbia. On the one hand, it was literally so \u2013 as by far the largest buyer in the market (public sector procurement of goods and services amounts to about 20% of GDP), its non-payments were, and perhaps still are, the first and largest link in the chains of illiquidity. On the other hand, it is the one that, by its example and actions, establishes a culture of (non)payment. It achieves this by entering into (un)realistic obligations, and then (not) paying them, as well as by systematically enforcing discipline in the private sector. This applies both to obligations that the state undertakes and to those by which it obligates others. If, for example, the state were to oblige businesses not to lay off employees, and we all know that many will not be able to pay them, and if it does not provide any way for these obligations to be paid, then we all know in advance that non-payment will occur. A culture of non-payment is spreading.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Maintaining a stable flow of money into the economic system will require the state to \u201esmooth out\u201c the difference between the plan and available funds through borrowing<\/strong><strong> on the financial market (in these circumstances, through the NBS \u201eprinting money\u201c),<\/strong><strong> and absolutely not, as has been the case so far, through non-payment (entering into arrears). <\/strong>Only in this way will it extinguish the fire of illiquidity instead of fanning it through non-payment. On the one hand, it is necessary to keep the deficit within desired proportions by establishing budgetary discipline, i.e., through realistic budget planning (and its revision when major unexpected turns occur). On the other hand, payments, i.e., injecting liquidity into the system, must proceed smoothly. The music must play constantly, and the state must pay for it promptly.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Realistic budget planning requires systemic, not just political, discipline of the public sector.<\/strong> Politicians at the head of the state, as well as their appointees and civil servants, should believe that budgets will be planned realistically, and costs paid promptly. This requires the introduction of genuine, expert, and professional, <em>ex ante<\/em> control of public budgets that will verify the realism of planning. Politicians might initially think they are at a disadvantage, as spending would escape arbitrary political influence. However, they would soon discover that they can still direct budget policy, and in return, they would gain significant points for successful crisis management.<\/p>\n<p><strong>As for the private sector, it is driven into financial discipline by payment discipline. Until a change in culture occurs, financial discipline must be imposed but also achievable. <\/strong>On the one hand, the prospect of forced collection or bankruptcy, if credible, will compel everyone to plan costs realistically and to pay. On the other hand, in situations exactly like the current one, the private sector must have sufficient liquidity available to be able to pay even when plans go awry.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em><u>Liquidity Availability<\/u><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ensuring liquidity, the third pillar of financial discipline, remains the task of the NBS. In these circumstances, it is very important that the Government assists it with adequate measures. The first measures to ensure liquidity for the Serbian economy taken by the NBS were quick and adequate.<\/p>\n<p>The NBS has already eased the debt burden on businesses and citizens for the first, shortest period. As a first measure, a moratorium on debt payments was introduced (although it should have been more limited, more on that in the next text). This created pressure on bank liquidity, which the NBS eased through favorable monetary and foreign exchange operations. <strong>The following are measures that should contribute to activating the financial sector's support for the economy, especially for those most affected. <\/strong>Furthermore, in this crisis situation, there is a twofold problem. Firstly, banks will need stronger incentives, as well as guarantees, to dare to issue new loans to most of their clients. Tomorrow's package is expected to stimulate short-term lending, with low, zero, or even negative interest rates. A negative interest rate represents a subsidy to the bank and\/or even to the business entity. In that case, it is not only about ensuring liquidity but also about financial assistance to the borrower. The package will likely include significant state guarantees for loans that banks issue under these crisis conditions, especially to the most affected sectors.<\/p>\n<p><strong>This classic package of enhanced financial liquidity measures will not be sufficient for Serbia, as its financial sector does not reach far or deep enough. <\/strong>The so-called \u201eshallowness of the financial market\u201c is reflected in the ratio between total domestic loans to businesses and GDP. While in countries with developed financial markets this ratio is usually 90-160% of GDP, in Serbia it is around 50%. In other transition countries, it is generally above 70-75%. On the one hand, this means that our economy relies heavily on its own resources and would not be as quickly affected by the drying up of bank loans as these countries. However, for the same reasons, the ability of our economy to recover after the crisis will depend on these resources not being depleted. A particular issue is that the majority of business entities are farmers and SMEs. SMEs generate about 27% of GDP, and farmers about 6% of GDP. As many as half of SMEs do not borrow from banks, and most of those who do borrow do so rarely. In these conditions, banks will not know them well enough to take the risk. To make matters worse, banks demand guarantees from small businesses using personal assets. How many of them will be willing to risk their assets? And how fair is it to ask them for this in these conditions? Serbia does not have a developed network of special institutions dedicated to supporting and financing SMEs like other countries do. For example, German stimulus packages provide for significant amounts of liquidity support (750 billion euros) to be channeled directly through these networks, both for SMEs and large enterprises.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The state should come to the aid of the NBS.<\/strong> It would be good if it actually accelerated the payment of all its obligations that are still pending in the courts or waiting in line at the Treasury. We know less about the Government's initial steps, but I hope that for now, at least, it continues to spend and regularly pay its obligations, so that its \u201epowerful\u201c demand and liquidity slow down the collapse of the economy \u2013 until the targeted measures in the announced package are put into operation. Also, in a very short period, I expect the state to help the liquidity of the system through segmented deferral of part of the tax obligations \u2013 at different rates for differently affected sectors and even for different sizes of companies. A small interest rate would encourage those who do not need liquidity to pay taxes anyway. The state will also pump liquidity through the aid funds it determines. It has already distributed subsidies to pensioners, and it should consider distributing subsidies per employee for SMEs as a complement, especially for entrepreneurs in the most affected branches. This would reach a significant number of households.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Many countries in the world (and Slovenia among them) have announced the purchase of corporate bonds that will likely target affected sectors.<\/strong> There are no corporate bonds in Serbia, but it could now be considered to encourage their creation and market development through aid to the economy. For example, it is worth considering the economic justification, and then the operational feasibility of securitizing receivables from certain segments of the corporate sector, especially SMEs. For example, administrative securitization of 30% receivables of the economy from SMEs with certain characteristics (size, sector, previous business success). These securities could be packaged into bundles that banks would purchase under favorable credit conditions and guarantees from the state. After the crisis, banks could unpack the bundles, collect the receivables, and trade these securities. Most likely, organizations would emerge that would be dedicated to assessing the value, purchasing, and collecting such securities. Unlike many other scenarios, the risk of such liquidity injection would be shared between banks and the state, and its cost could be calculated in advance.<\/p>\n<p>The Serbian economy will not emerge stronger from this crisis, just as the economy of the rest of the world will not. However, with political will and the proverbial ability of Serbian society to quickly improvise and achieve a lot in a short time under difficult conditions, Serbia can emerge from this crisis with a significantly strengthened macroeconomic management system. This would enable it to be among the faster, rather than the slowest, countries in recovering from the crisis.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Autor: dr Kori Udovi\u010dki, prva objava 29.3.2020, revizija 1.4.2020. Preuzmite tekst u PDF-u Pandemija nas je zadesila taman kad je disciplina pla\u0107anja u Srbiji po\u010dela zna\u010dajnije da ja\u010da. Po\u0161to su u 2016. godini poja\u010dane mere finansijske discipline za privatni sektor, a u sklopu fiskalne konsolidacije smanjena nepla\u0107anja dr\u017eave, lanac nelikvidnosti kona\u010dno je bitno smanjen. Naravno, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n<div class=\"moje-dodatne-kategorije\"><span class=\"cat-label\">Programska oblast: <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/category\/vesti\/\" class=\"moj-cat-link\">Vesti<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/category\/projekti\/ekonomsko-upravljanje-i-poslovno-okruzenje\/\" class=\"moj-cat-link\">Ekonomsko upravljanje i poslovno okru\u017eenje<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/category\/projekti\/razvoj-privatnog-sektora-i-industrijska-politika\/\" class=\"moj-cat-link\">Razvoj privatnog sektora i industrijska politika<\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":6900,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,59,68],"tags":[61,69,70],"class_list":["post-6888","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-vesti","category-ekonomsko-upravljanje-i-poslovno-okruzenje","category-razvoj-privatnog-sektora-i-industrijska-politika","tag-budzet","tag-msp","tag-sme"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.7 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Imperativ za mere podr\u0161ke - obilata likvidnost uz disciplinu pla\u0107anja - Ceves | Centar za visoke ekonomske studije<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/sr-imperativ-za-mere-podrske-obilata-likvidnost-uz-disciplinu-placanja\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Imperativ za mere podr\u0161ke - obilata likvidnost uz disciplinu pla\u0107anja - Ceves | Centar za visoke ekonomske studije\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Autor: dr Kori Udovi\u010dki, prva objava 29.3.2020, revizija 1.4.2020. Preuzmite tekst u PDF-u Pandemija nas je zadesila taman kad je disciplina pla\u0107anja u Srbiji po\u010dela zna\u010dajnije da ja\u010da. Po\u0161to su u 2016. godini poja\u010dane mere finansijske discipline za privatni sektor, a u sklopu fiskalne konsolidacije smanjena nepla\u0107anja dr\u017eave, lanac nelikvidnosti kona\u010dno je bitno smanjen. Naravno, [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/en\/sr-imperativ-za-mere-podrske-obilata-likvidnost-uz-disciplinu-placanja\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Ceves | Centar za visoke ekonomske studije\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/CEVES.org\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-03-29T08:59:18+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-11-11T14:48:05+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/ceves.org.rs\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/injection.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"500\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"333\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Stefan Radisavljevic\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@CEVES1\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@CEVES1\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Stefan Radisavljevic\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"13 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/sr-imperativ-za-mere-podrske-obilata-likvidnost-uz-disciplinu-placanja\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/sr-imperativ-za-mere-podrske-obilata-likvidnost-uz-disciplinu-placanja\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Stefan Radisavljevic\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/ceves.org.rs\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/2c1e819f2d06fc068dd55466231f1e16\"},\"headline\":\"Imperativ za mere podr\u0161ke &#8211; 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Preuzmite tekst u PDF-u Pandemija nas je zadesila taman kad je disciplina pla\u0107anja u Srbiji po\u010dela zna\u010dajnije da ja\u010da. Po\u0161to su u 2016. godini poja\u010dane mere finansijske discipline za privatni sektor, a u sklopu fiskalne konsolidacije smanjena nepla\u0107anja dr\u017eave, lanac nelikvidnosti kona\u010dno je bitno smanjen. 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