Delimo sa vama bilten za prvi kvartal 2026. godine, u kome se bavimo privredom koja na prvi pogled pokazuje nešto bolji rezultat nego tokom prošlogodišnjeg usporavanja, ali bez znakova širokog i održivog oporavka. Iza preliminarne stope rasta od 3,0% sve jasnije se vidi iscrpljenost razvojnog modela koji je dugo počivao na javnoj potrošnji, velikim projektima i uskom krugu izvoznih sektora, dok domaći privatni sektor i dalje nema dovoljno snažan oslonac za novi investicioni i produktivni zamah.
U CEVES Opservatoriji pokazujemo da rast u prvom kvartalu ne počiva na širokom oporavku privrede, već na ograničenim izvorima: rastu zarada (naročito u javnom sektoru) i penzijama, EXPO-u, izvozu motornih vozila, rudarstvu i zalihama. Posebno zabrinjava to što se oporavak još ne vidi u investicijama, prerađivačkoj industriji i domaćim MSP, upravo u delovima privrede koji bi morali da nadomeste slabljenje dosadašnjih pokretača rasta.
Međutim, aktuelna ekonomska politika nastavlja da podriva konkurentnost.
U CEVES Stavu ukazujemo da najnovije izmene pravila za donošenje propisa nisu tehničko ubrzanje evropskog usklađivanja, već zaobilaženje javnosti, kao i ozbiljan udar na stručnost i profesionalnost javne uprave. Time se slabi upravo ono što bi trebalo da bude osnova evropskog puta Srbije: odgovorno odlučivanje, obrazložene javne politike i institucije koje rade u javnom interesu.
CEVES Opservatorija
Početak 2026. naizgled donosi nešto višu stopu rasta, ali slabije izglede za budući rast. Nakon što je rast BDP-a usporio sa 3,9% u 2024. na 2,0% u 2025. godini, delimični oporavak na 2,2% u Q4 nije označio povratak snažnijem rastu privatne privrede. Ako fleš procena od 3,0% za Q1 2026. nije precenjena, ona odražava isti obrazac. Rast se i dalje zasniva na realnom rastu zarada i tekućoj javnoj potrošnji, EXPO i stambenoj izgradnji, kao i na nekoliko velikih izvoznih oslonaca, pre svega povezanih sa Stellantisom, Zijinom i gumarskim SDI. Ostatak privrede stagnira ili usporava.
Javni izdaci i realne zarade nastavile su da podstiču potrošnju, stambenu tražnju i infrastrukturne projekte. Međugodišnje fiskalno popuštanje u Q1 2026 (mereno kroz primarni deficit bez plaćanja za Rafale i kapitalnih rashoda) iznosilo je oko 1,2% kvartalnog BDP-a, odnosno oko 250 miliona evra. To je rezltat rasta tekuće potrošnje od 14,3%, uz rast rashoda za zarade, penzije, robu i usluge u rasponu 10-16%. Realne zarade su u januaru i februaru porasle 8,5% međugodišnje, delom zbog zarada javnog sektora i realnog povećanja minimalne zarade od oko 10%, a delom zbog i dalje nerešenih neusklađenosti ponude i tražnje na tržištu rada. Ovo je uticalo na najveći rast realnog prometa u maloprodaji u poslednjih 7 kvartala (8%). Stambena tražnja je takođe ostala snažna, uz rast stambenih kredita stanovništvu od preko 60% međugodišnje šesti kvartal zaredom. Zajedno sa kapitalnim rashodima države vezanim za EXPO i investicijama EPS-a i EDS-a, ovo u najvećoj meri objašnjava rast investicija od 8,9% u Q4 2025. Sličan trend nastavlja se i u Q1 2026.
Privatne investicije najjasnije pokazuju da oporavka nema. Novi investicioni krediti preduzećima, posle rasta od 46,2% u 2024, usporili su na 13,0% tokom 2025. godine, i gotovo stali u Q4 2025, da bi u Q1 2026 pali za čak 18,9% međugodišnje. U slučaju MSP pad je iznosio 23,7%. SDI su se kretale istim smerom. Prilivi su 2025. pali 34%, a u januaru i februaru 2026. bili još skoro 30% niži međugodišnje. Dodatno, oporavak investicija iz EU i prerađivačke industrije u velikoj meri je prividan budući da se u najvećoj meri radi o kineskim kompanijama (Linglong i Ziđin) koje imaju sedište u Holandiji. Najave novih SDI za 2026. takođe se uglavnom svodi na manje kineske investicije u automobilske i EV povezane delatnosti, dok strani dobavljači iz radno intenzivnih sektora nastavljaju da najavljuju zatvaranja i smanjenje aktivnosti.
Razmenjivi deo privrede pokazuje koliko je konkurentnost Srbije postala usko zasnovana. Nastavljajući trend iz Q4 2025, ukupna industrijska proizvodnja pala je 0,8% u Q1 2026, a prerađivačka industrija 0,4%. Kada se isključi pad izvoza električne energije, robni izvoz porastao je 9,1%, ali je gotovo ceo rast došao iz nekoliko oslonaca. To su Stelantis, proizvodnja guma u stranom vlasništvu, izvoz povezan sa Ziđinom i ostali osnovni metali. Kada se ovi oslonci izdvoje, ostatak industrije u najboljem slučaju stagnira ili oscilira, dok proizvodnja tekstila, odeće i nameštaja nastavlja da slabi. Izvoz usluga je tokom 2025. imao stabilizujuću ulogu, pre svega kroz poslovne usluge, dok je IKT postepeno usporavao. Ipak, izvoz usluga pao je 1,7% u januaru i februaru, sada uz stagnaciju poslovnih usluga i IKT-a.
Tržište rada pokazuje kako se pritisak na konkurentnost prenosi na zaposlenost. Zarade su nastavile da rastu brže od produktivnosti, a usporavanje rasta jediničnih troškova rada u 2025. došlo je pre svega kroz prilagođavanje broja zaposlenih, a ne kroz rast produktivnostiU Q1 2026. registrovana zaposlenost pala je blago ukupno, ali je u prerađivačkoj industriji smanjena 3,3%. Prijavljene potrebe poslodavaca za radnicima pale su 22% u martu, dok je broj korisnika naknade za nezaposlenost porastao 13%. Budući da je Srbija već izgubila troškovnu konkurentsku prednost u odnosu na sve zemlje CIE, održivi rast (zarada) može da dođe samo iz rasta produktivnosti. Ipak, fokus ekonomske politike i dalje je pretežno drugde, na merama koje nastavljaju da podrivaju konkurentnost umesto da je jačaju.
CEVES Stav
Nove Uredbe — novo izigravanje usklađivanja sa EU acquis
CEVES poziva sve zainteresovane za dobro upravljanje Srbijom da se usprotive nedavno donetim izmenama uredaba o procesu donošenja novih propisa i javnih politika („propisa“ u daljem tekstu). Tim izmenama Vlada je sebe oslobodila obaveze da nove propise izlaže javnim konsultacijama kao i da ih podnosi na ocenu Republičkom sekretarijatu za javne politike (RSJP).
Oslobađanje važi „samo“ za slučajeve kad se propis tiče „usklađivanja sa
pravom EU”, što suštinski može biti skoro sve što može da se menja u propisima. Daleko od „praktičnog rešenja” na evropskom putu kakim se predstavlja, ovo je početak završne faze uništavanja profesionalne državne uprave — koju vlast sprovodi iz sopstvenih, dakako praktičnih, razloga.
Reč je o taktici kojom se snažno proširuje prostor za samovolju vlasti, odnosno u kom će ona moći da nas dovodi pred svršen čin. Pogledajmo slučaj
„Mrdićevih zakona” o tužilaštvu. Te su mere bile toliko ne-demokratske i ne-evropske da je EK pokrenula Venecijansku komisiju da ubrzano da mišljenje na iste. O tom mišljenju se sad raspravlja kroz pogrešnu proceduru, i premda je mišljenje neuobičajeno detaljno i direktivno—teško je verovati da će se sve bitne stvari vratiti u pređašnje stanje. Najteže će biti ono najvažnije — da se svi profesionalni i vredni tužioci koji su radili na osetljivim predmetima u TOKu, vrate na iste.
Dakle, mišljenje „Evrope“ može da zakrpi krčag, ali mleko će ostati prosuto. Ako ove Uredbe ostanu punovažne, ni civilno društvo ni RSJP, neće moći na vreme da upozore na problematične propise. Pod „problematičnim“ ne mislimo samo na ne-demokratičnost, već i na niz mogućih „iskrenih“ grešaka i neusklađenosti na koje danas RSJP i civilno društvo ukazuju pre nego što naprave štetu.
RSJP nije bilo koja institucija. On je verovatno najvažniji, a svakako jedinstveni rezultat skoro decenije i po napora — i znatnih EU sredstava — uloženih da se unapredi rad uprave u Srbiji, a pogotovo da se izgradi „centar vlade” bez kojeg ozbiljnog upravljanja državom ne može da bude. Sama EU je nebrojeno puta istakla „značaj snažne uloge kontrole kvaliteta Republičkog sekretarijata za javne politike i drugih institucija centra vlade”. Nadam se da će stoga što pre
prepoznati da ovim manevrom režim značajno podiže temperaturu lonca u kom nas već deceniju, kao žabe, kuva. Ukoliko Uredbe ostanu na snazi, prva reformska tekovina koja će se izgubiti biće sam RSJP — iz njega će preostali profesionalci početi da otiču. Biće to prva, ali sigurno ne i jedina.
Još o ovome, a za odličnu analizu adv. Đorđa Vukotića kliknite ovde.
— Kori Udovički
Predstavljanje prvog CEVESovog izveštaja o ekonomskom upravljanju i panel diskusija
CEVES je 16. aprila 2026. godine predstavio izveštaj „Upravljanje za konkurentnost: polazna ocena ekonomskog upravljanja“, izrađen uz podršku Delegacije Evropske unije u Srbiji. Reč je o prvom CEVES izveštaju ove vrste, u kojem se ekonomsko upravljanje u Srbiji sagledava kroz prizmu konkurentnosti, odnosno kroz sposobnost privrede da ostvaruje široko zasnovan rast produktivnosti i da izdrži konkurentske pritiske u procesu približavanja Evropskoj uniji. Izveštaj je najpre objavljen na sajtu na samom kraju 2025. godine, a predstavljen u aprilu 2026. kao polazna ocena u okviru šireg istraživačkog ciklusa koji će CEVES nastaviti kroz godišnje izveštaje. Rad na narednom izdanju je već započet uz ponovnu podršku Delegacije Evropske unije u Srbiji.
Izveštaj analizira prvi podkriterijum funkcionalne tržišne ekonomije, ekonomsko upravljanje, i njegove efekte na konkurentnost, produktivnost i održivost modela rasta Srbije. Metodološki, analiza kombinuje uporedno praćenje konvergencije Srbije ka EU, sektorsku analizu produktivnosti i razmenjivih delatnosti, razmatranje makroekonomskih i realnih pokazatelja, kao i budžetsku analizu javnih rashoda i instrumenata podrške privredi. Detaljnu metodologiju možete videti ovde. Glavni nalaz je da je Srbija tokom prethodne decenije ostvarila makroekonomsku stabilizaciju i postepeno približavanje EU, ali da je taj napredak ograničen sporim rastom produktivnosti, posebno u sektorima na kojima počivaju izvozna i dugoročna konkurentnost. Izveštaj ukazuje na to da se dosadašnji model rasta u prevelikoj meri oslanjao na javne investicije, subvencionisane strane direktne investicije i rad niže cene, dok su domaći privatni sektor, tehnološko unapređenje i mala i srednja preduzeća ostali nedovoljno podržani. Takva kombinacija politika stvara rizik od „proizvedene holandske bolesti“, odnosno rasta troškova i cena bez dovoljno snažnog rasta realne produktivnosti, čime se postepeno narušava konkurentska prednost Srbije, a koja je nastala kao rezultat grešaka u vođenju ekonomske politike.
Preporuke izveštaja usmerene su na mere koje mogu neposredno da unaprede transparentnost, podršku izvozu i MSP sektoru, praćenje javnih investicija i kvalitet ekonomskog upravljanja, kao i na pripremu šireg institucionalnog zaokreta ka modelu rasta zasnovanom na produktivnosti. Izveštaj možete pogledati ovde.
Foto: Forbes Srbija
Nakon predstavljanja izveštaja održana je panel diskusija koju je moderirao prof. dr Branko Radulović, a u kojoj su učestvovali akademik Pavle Petrović, prof. dr Miodrag Jovanović, dr Kori Udovički, prof. dr Jasna Atanasijević i dr Andrej Bartosiewicz iz Delegacije Evropske unije u Srbiji. Diskusija je istakla jednu od ključnih poruka izveštaja: bez vladavine prava, koja uključuje ne samo nezavisno pravosuđe već i profesionalan, autonoman i odgovoran rad institucija izvršne vlasti, Srbija ne može da pokrene rast produktivnosti i istinski razvoj domaće privrede potreban za izlazak iz ćorsokaka dosadašnjeg modela rasta.
Ključna poruka panela bila je da Srbija mora da napravi razvojni zaokret, od rasta zasnovanog na jeftinoj radnoj snazi i selektivnoj podršci ka ekonomiji koja počiva na produktivnosti, domaćem preduzetništvu i jednakim pravilima igre.
Kako je istakao Pavle Petrović, rast zasnovan na „velikom zapošljavanju jeftine radne snage” i investicijama male dodate vrednosti „nije dugoročno održiv”.
Miodrag Jovanović naglasio je da bez inkluzivnih institucija nema „bazične jednakosti pred zakonom”, dok je Kori Udovički poručila da se za vladavinu prava mora usmeriti pažnja ne samo na pravosuđe, već i na upravu. U istom duhu, Jasna Atanasijević istakla je da reforme zahtevaju da se državni službenici osposobe da ocene koji je cilj propisa i kakav se efekat od njih očekuje. Andrej Bartosiewicz je ocenio da transparentnost državne pomoći smanjuje prostor za posebne dogovore sa pojedinačnim kompanijama. Samo takav model može obezbediti da rast Srbije bude ne samo brži, već pravedniji, otporniji i zasnovan na stvaranju stvarne domaće vrednosti.
Vaš CEVES Tim
Kori Udovički, Pavle Medić, Ivona Janović, Dušan Kovačević, Velibor Tatić, Vojislav Stojanović i Jana Stanković
We share with you the bulletin for the first quarter of 2026, in which we examine an economy that, at first glance, shows a somewhat better result than during last year’s slowdown, yet without signs of a broad and sustainable recovery.
Behind the preliminary growth rate of 3.0%, the exhaustion of a development
model long reliant on public spending, large projects, and a narrow set of export sectors is becoming ever more apparent, while the domestic private sector still lacks a sufficiently strong foundation for a new investment and productivity impulse.
In the CEVES Observatory, we demonstrate that growth in the first quarter does not rest on a broad economic recovery, but on limited sources: growth in wages (especially in the public sector) and pensions, EXPO, motor vehicle exports, mining, and inventories. Of particular concern is the fact that recovery has yet to materialise in investment, manufacturing, and domestic SMEs — precisely those segments of the economy that would need to compensate for the weakening of the growth drivers that have prevailed until now. However, current economic policy continues to undermine competitiveness.
In the CEVES Position, we argue that the latest changes to the rules governing the adoption of regulations are not a technical acceleration of EU alignment, but rather a circumvention of the public — and a serious blow to the expertise and professionalism of the public administration. This weakens precisely what should serve as the foundation of Serbia’s European path: accountable decision-making, justified public policies, and institutions that operate in the public interest.
CEVES Observatory
The start of 2026 appears to bring a somewhat higher growth rate, but weaker prospects for future growth. Following the slowdown in GDP growth from 3.9% in 2024 to 2.0% in 2025, the partial recovery to 2.2% in Q4 did not signal a return to stronger private-sector growth. If the flash estimate of 3.0%
for Q1 2026 is not overstated, it reflects the same pattern. Growth continues to rest on real wage growth and current public expenditure, EXPO and residential construction, and a handful of large export anchors — primarily linked to Stellantis, Zijin, and rubber industry FDI. The rest of the economy is stagnating or decelerating.
Public expenditure and real wages continued to drive consumption,
housing demand, and infrastructure projects. Year-on-year fiscal loosening in Q1 2026 (measured through the primary deficit excluding Rafale payments and capital expenditure) amounted to approximately 1.2% of quarterly GDP, or around €250 million. This is the result of a 14.3% rise in current expenditure, with growth in wages, pensions, goods, and services ranging from 10–16%.
Real wages rose 8.5% year-on-year in January and February, partly due to public-sector wages and a roughly 10% real increase in the minimum wage, and partly due persistently unaddressed labour-market mismatches. This
contributed to the largest year-on-year increase in real retail trade turnover in seven quarters (8%). Housing demand also remained strong, with residential mortgage lending to households growing by more than 60% year-on-year for the sixth consecutive quarter. Together with state capital expenditures related to EXPO and investments by EPS and EDS, these factors largely explain the 8.9% investment growth recorded in Q4 2025. A similar trend is continuing into Q1 2026.
Private investment most clearly demonstrates the absence of recovery.
New investment loans to enterprises, after growing by 46.2% in 2024, slowed to 13.0% in 2025, came to a near standstill in Q4 2025, and fell by as much as 18.9% year-on-year in Q1 2026. For SMEs, the decline was 23.7%. FDI followed the same trajectory: inflows fell 34% in 2025, and were nearly 30%
lower year-on-year in January and February 2026. Furthermore, the apparent recovery of investment from the EU and in the manufacturing sector is largely illusory, as it consists predominantly of Chinese companies (Linglong and Zijin) domiciled in the Netherlands. Announcements of new FDI for 2026 are likewise largely confined to smaller Chinese investments in automotive and EV-related activities, while foreign suppliers in labour-intensive sectors continue to announce closures and reductions in activity.
Production and exports reveal how narrow Serbia’s competitiveness base has become. Continuing the trend from Q4 2025, overall industrial production
fell by 0.8% in Q1 2026, with manufacturing declining by 0.4%. Excluding electricity, goods exports grew by 9.1%, but almost all of the increase came from Stellantis, rubber-sector FDI, Zijin and the rest of basic metals. Outside these anchors, the rest of industry is at best stagnant or oscillating, while
textiles, clothing, and furniture continue to weaken. Services exports played a stabilising role in 2025 — primarily through business services — while ICT gradually decelerated. Nevertheless, services exports fell by 1.7% in January and February, with business services and ICT now also stagnating.
Labour market dynamics illustrate how competitiveness pressures are translating into employment. Wages have continued to grow faster than productivity, and the deceleration in unit labour cost growth in 2025 came primarily through headcount adjustment rather than productivity gains. In Q1 2026, registered employment fell modestly overall but declined by 3.3% in manufacturing. Reported employer demand for labour fell by 22% in March, while the number of unemployment benefit recipients rose by 13%. Having already lost its cost-competitiveness advantage relative to all Central and Eastern European countries, Serbia can sustain (wage) growth only through
productivity growth. Yet the policy focus remains largely elsewhere – on policies that continue to erode rather than strengthen Serbia’s competitiveness.
CEVES View
New Decrees — A New Circumvention of EU Acquis Alignment
CEVES calls on all those concerned with good governance in Serbia to oppose the recently adopted amendments to the decrees governing the process of adopting new regulations and public policies (hereinafter “regulations”).
Through these amendments, the Government has exempted itself from the obligation to subject new regulations to public consultation and to submit them for assessment to the Republic Secretariat for Public Policies (RSJP). This exemption applies “only” to cases where a regulation concerns “alignment with EU law” — which in practice can encompass virtually any regulatory change.
Far from being the “practical solution” on the European path it is presented as, this marks the beginning of the final phase in the dismantling of a professional state administration — carried out by those in power for their own, admittedly practical, reasons.
This is a tactic that substantially expands the space for arbitrary governance — one in which the authorities will be able to present us with faits accomplis.
Consider the case of the “Mrdić laws” on the prosecution service. Those measures were so undemocratic and un-European that the European Commission prompted the Venice Commission to issue an expedited opinion on them. That opinion is now being discussed through the wrong procedure, and although it is unusually detailed and directive in nature, it is difficult to believe that all substantive matters will be restored to their previous state. The hardest to restore will be the most important: ensuring that all professional and dedicated prosecutors who worked on sensitive cases within the Special
Prosecutor’s Office (TOK) return to those same positions.
In other words, the “European” opinion may formally patch things up, but by then the damage will already have been done. If these decrees remain in force, neither civil society nor the RSJP will be able to flag problematic regulations in time. By “problematic” we mean not only measures that are undemocratic, but also the range of possible “well-intentioned” errors and inconsistencies that the RSJP and civil society currently identify before they cause harm.
The RSJP is not just any institution. It is arguably the most important — and certainly the most unique — achievement of nearly a decade and a half of effort, and substantial EU funding, invested in improving the functioning of Serbia’s administration, and in particular in building the “centre of government” without which serious state governance is simply not possible. The EU itself has on countless occasions underscored “the importance of the strong quality control role of the Republic Secretariat for Public Policies and other centre-of-
government institutions.” I therefore hope it will promptly recognise that with this manoeuvre, the regime is significantly raising the temperature of the pot in which it has been boiling us, like frogs, for a decade. Should the decrees remain in force, the first reform achievement to be lost will be the RSJP itself — the remaining professionals will begin to leave. That will be the first casualty, but certainly not the last.
Launch of CEVES’s first economic governance report and panel discussion
On 16 April 2026, CEVES launched the report “Governance for Competitiveness: A Baseline Assessment of Economic Governance,” produced with the support of the Delegation of the European Union to Serbia. This is
CEVES’s first report of this kind, examining economic governance in Serbia through the lens of competitiveness — that is, through the economy’s capacity to achieve broadly based productivity growth and to withstand competitive pressures in the process of approximation to the European Union. The report was first published on the CEVES website at the very end of 2025 and presented in April 2026 as a baseline assessment within a broader research cycle that CEVES will continue through annual reports. Work on the next edition has already begun, once again with the support of the EU Delegation to Serbia.
The report analyses the first sub-criterion of a functioning market economy — economic governance — and its effects on competitiveness, productivity, and the sustainability of Serbia’s growth model. Methodologically, the analysis combines a comparative tracking of Serbia’s convergence towards the EU, a sectoral analysis of productivity and tradable activities, an examination of macroeconomic and real indicators, and a fiscal analysis of public expenditure and business support instruments. You can find the detailed methodology here. The main finding is that Serbia has achieved macroeconomic stabilisation and gradual approximation to the EU over the past decade, but that this progress is constrained by slow productivity growth — particularly in the sectors underpinning export competitiveness and long-term economic resilience. The report highlights that the prevailing growth model has relied excessively on public investment, subsidised FDI, and cheaper labour, while the domestic private sector, technological upgrading, and small and medium-sized enterprises have remained insufficiently supported. This combination of policies creates the risk of a “manufactured Dutch disease” — that is, rising costs and prices without commensurately strong real productivity growth, thereby gradually eroding the competitive advantage Serbia had built, as a result of errors in economic policy management. The report’s recommendations focus on measures that can directly improve transparency, support for exports and SMEs, monitoring of public investments, and the quality of economic governance, as well as on preparations for a broader institutional pivot towards a productivity-based growth model. You can view the report here.
Photo: Forbes Serbia
Following the report launch, a panel discussion was held, moderated by Prof. Dr. Branko Radulović, with the participation of Academician Pavle Petrović,
Prof. Dr. Miodrag Jovanović, Dr. Kori Udovički, Prof. Dr. Jasna Atanasijević, and Dr. Andrej Bartosiewicz of the EU Delegation to Serbia. The discussion underscored one of the report’s key messages: without the rule of law — encompassing not only an independent judiciary but also the professional, autonomous, and accountable functioning of executive institutions — Serbia cannot generate the productivity growth and genuine development of the domestic economy needed to escape the impasse of its current growth model.
The panel’s central message was that Serbia must make a developmental shift
— away from growth based on cheap labour and selective support, towards an economy grounded in productivity, domestic entrepreneurship, and a level playing field. As Pavle Petrović observed, growth premised on “large-scale employment of cheap labour” and low-value-added investment “is not sustainable in the long term.” Miodrag Jovanović emphasised that without inclusive institutions there can be no “fundamental equality before the law,” while Kori Udovički stressed that in the pursuit of the rule of law, attention must be directed not only at the judiciary but also at the administration. In the same vein, Jasna Atanasijević noted that reforms require equipping civil servants with the capacity to assess the objective of a regulation and the effects expected from it. Andrej Bartosiewicz argued that transparency in state aid reduces the scope for special arrangements with individual companies. Only such a model can ensure that Serbia’s growth is not merely faster, but fairer, more resilient, and grounded in the creation of genuine domestic value.
Your CEVES Team
Kori Udovički, Pavle Medić, Ivona Janović, Dušan Kovačević, Velibor Tatić, Vojislav Stojanović and Jana Stanković
